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Speedy Trial -No "Mere Ceremonial"
Robert B. Henn*
N RECENT YEARS, THERE HAS BEEN A PROGRESSIVE REFINEMENT OF IN-
DIVIDUAL RIGHTS, to the extent that due process must be accorded
to the participant in not only judicial proceedings, but administrative
actions as well.' Yet, in the face of this, the anomaly exists that one
highly important individual right, clearly defined by the Speedy-
Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment, is persistently abused by
courts who adhere to overly strict, and demonstrably improper, in-
terpretations of its requirements, and by prosecutors who seem to
feel that a prompt determination of the innocence or guilt of the
accused is a matter of grace, not of right.
However, a clear description of Sixth-Amendment rights points
out that:
... These are not mere ceremonials to be neglected at
will in the interests of a crowded calendar or other expedi-
encies. They are basic rights. They bulk large in the totality
of procedural rights guaranteed to a person accused of a
crime. . ..
In the light of Supreme Court decisions handed down within the
last five years,3 and recently promulgated rules of court,4 the Sixth-
Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial, long a step-child of con-
stitutional law, may be coming to life. Admittedly, the vitalization
of this fundamental right is more apparent than real at present.
While the Supreme Court, in Dickey v. Florida,5 has ruled on the right
of an accused to a speedy trial, the real analysis of the subject was
in a concurring opinion.6 But the second circuit rules, while still too
new for the effect to be felt, continue to permit prosecutorial delay
for "good cause".7 Whether prosecution is delayed for "good cause",
ineptness or downright malice, the emotional and monetary toll taken
of the accused is the same.
While the Sixth Amendment guarantees to the accused "... the
right to a speedy and public trial. . .", the federal and state judi-
ciaries have long acted in what must seem to defendants like a con-
*B.S., Western Reserve University; M.S., Western Reserve University; Fourth-year
student, Cleveland State University College of Law.
I Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
2 Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 364 (1959).
3 See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) ; Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S.
374 (1969) ; Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970) ; United States v. Marion, -U.S.
-, 30 L.Ed.2d (1971).
4 United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition
of Criminal Cases, as amended May 24, 1971, 442 F.2d LIX.
5 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
e Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 44 (1970).
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition
of Criminal Cases, as amended May 24, 1971, 442 F.2d LIX, Rule 4, at LX.
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spiracy to deny that right of speedy trial.8 In passing, it must be noted
that while the framers of the Constitution saw fit to place the rights
of speedy and public trial on the same plane by use of the conjunctive,
the courts have seen fit to bend every effort toward assuring a public
trial,9 but have resorted to nearly every strategem in the book to
avoid reversing convictions or dismissing indictments for failure of
a speedy trial.10
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has not spoken on the one point
which seems to be the rallying cry of those who would deny the right
to a speedy trial for the accused: the doctrine of "waiver"." The
waiver doctrine, briefly stated, is that one accused of a crime must
affirmatively seek to be tried,' 2 resist all efforts by the prosecution
to delay the trial,'8 and take no affirmative action of his own to
delay trial.14 If he fails in any of these requirements, he is deemed
to have "waived" his right to be tried speedily.
The Court has affirmed the right of the accused to a speedy trial,
by holding that a prisoner in a federal penitentiary has been denied
that right by a state which took no action to have him returned to
the state for trial until after the expiration of his federal sentence; 15
that the right is applicable to the states through the provisions of
8 For a discussion and analysis of the speedy-trial question, see generally Note, The
Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAle. L. REV. 476 (1968), Note, The Lagging Right to
a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REV. 1587 (1965).
9 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1956).
10 See, e.g., State ex rel. Lotz v. Hover, 174- Ohio St. 68, 186 N.E.2d 841, 843 (1962),
("... [Rlight to a speedy trial does not automatically accrue to the accused." . . .);
State v. Sawyer, 266 Wis., 494, 63 N.W.2d 749, 751 (1954), (('The State and Federal
Constitutions guarantee a right to a speedy, public trial but they do not compel one
unless the person accused claims the right. . . .") (Emphasis added.) ; State v. Cun-
ningham, 171 Ohio St. 54, 167 N.E.2d 897, 902 (1960), (". . . [W]here a criminal
cause is continued without disclosing the ground, the court will presume the con-
tinuance was upon sufficient ground, in the absence of anything in the record to the
contrary . . . and [notwithstanding] the fact that the cause had already been con-
tinued three times on motion of the state.") (Emphasis added).
11 Not only has the Court not spoken on the waiver doctrine as applied to Sixth-
Amendment considerations of speedy trial, it has hardly spoken on speedy trial
at all. Beside the cases cited in note 3, supra, only three cases dealt substantially with
speedy trial per se, and did not touch upon waiver. See Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S.
77 (1905) ; Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957); United States v. Ewell,
383 U.S. 116 (1966).
12 The comment by the court in Cunningham v. Haskins, Supt., 3 Ohio St.2d, 86, 209
N.E.2d 211 (1965), is reasonably representative: ". . . to constitute a denial of speedy
trial, petitioner must have made a request for trial. He cannot create this defense
by nonaction on his own part." See also United States v. Kaye, 251 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 919 (1958). For a case showing an affirmative applica-
tion of the demand moiety of the waiver doctrine, cf. Kane v. Virginia, 419 F.2d 1369
(6th Cir. 1970), where a federal prisoner was granted habeas corpus relief and dis-
missal of state charges for lack of speedy trial (under the doctrine of Smith v.
Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) ; in Kane, the prisoner had made persistent demands upon
the Virginia authorities to be tried.
13 United States v. Dichiarinte, 385 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
945 (1969).
'4 See, e.g., State v. Rice, 14 Ohio App.Zd 20, 235 N.E.2d 732, 734 (1968), where the
court said, ". . • if any delay could be ascribed to pleas, motions or proceedings filed
on behalf of defendant, then claim of lack of speedy trial will fail. . . ." (Emphasis
added.) But see State v. Meeker, 26 Ohio St.2d 9, 268 N.E.2d 589 (1971).
15 Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
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the Fourteenth Amendment; 16 that a state may not withhold prose-
cution of a charge, only to reinstate it a at later and more propitious
time.' 7 But in each case, the defendant had strenuously asserted his
right to be tried speedily, had resisted prosecution efforts at delay,
and had done no acts which could reasonably be construed as dilatory.
Thus, the legitimacy of the waiver doctrine has never been squarely
faced by the court.18 Which is not to say that the question has never
been presented.19
But whatever the reasons for not addressing the question of
waiver squarely in the past, Mr. Justice Brennan's analytical con-
currence in Dickey20 may portend some reversal of restrictive lower-
court rulings in times not too distant.
Indeed, the second circuit rules on the subject of "prompt dis-
position of criminal cases" indicate a growing awareness on the part
of the judiciary, at least, that the subject does need the guidance of
somebody besides the prosecutor's office.21
The contention is made here that the Sixth-Amendment right to
a speedy trial is far too important to the proper adjudication of
rights under our Constitution for the cavalier treatment it has re-
ceived in the courts. Indeed, ". . . the equation of silence or inaction
with waiver is a fiction that has been categorically rejected by this
Court when other fundamental rights are at stake .... "22 It is also
worthy of note that the commentators on the subject are uniformly
critical of the waiver doctrine.
23
The Tripartite Waiver Doctrine
Demand
The majority rule in the United States, with respect to waiver
of the right to a speedy trial by the inaction of the accused, holds
'5 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
1T Id.
18 Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905) ; Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354- (1957)
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969)
Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970) ; Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967).
19 See e.g., Worthington v. United States, 1 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 266
U.S. 626 (1924); United States v. Kaye, 251 F.gd 87 (2d Cir. 1957), cert denied, 356
U.S. 919 (1958); Parker v. United States, 252 F.2d 680 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 964 (1958) ; State v. Williams, 157 Conn. 114, 249, A.2d 245 (1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1969) ; United States v. Fassoulis, 293 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961) ; United States v. Dichiarinte, 385 F.2d 333 (7th Cir.
1967), cert. denied. 390 U.S. 945 (1969).
20 Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 39 (1970).
21 United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition
of Criminal Cases, as amended May 24, 1971, 442 F.2d LIX.
22 Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 51 (1970).
23 See e.g., Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COL. L. REV. 846 (1957)
Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REV. 1587 (1965); Note,
Effective Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, 77 YALE
LAW J. 767 (1968) ; Comment, The Convict's Right to a Speedy Trial, 61 CRIM. LAW
J. 352, 360-64 (1970) ; Note, 49 NEBR. L. REV. 166 (1969).
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that the defendant in a criminal proceeding must demand to be tried,
or he will not be heard to complain later that he was denied a speedy
trial.24 A vigorous minority, however, decries this position, holding
that a state or the federal government, having begun the proceedings
against the accused in the first place, is under a duty to carry the
cause forward by the mandate of the Sixth Amendment and corres-
ponding provisions in state constitutions. This minority view is gain-
ing adherents, and enjoys the position of better constitutional logic.
For instance, in United States v. Dillon,25 the accused had been indicted
approximately eight years prior to the reported decision in 1960. The
case had been handled by one assistant district attorney after an-
other, but for reasons not expressed in the opinion, was never brought
to trial. While Dillon was not ready at all times to stand trial, never-
theless continuances or delays which could be ascribed to him were
very few in number; on the other hand, the government had sought
one delay after another. Finally, when the case was brought on for
trial in 1960, Dillon moved for dismissal on the grounds that he had
been denied a speedy trial. The district court agreed with him.
In People v. Prosser,26 the petitioner had been sentenced under a
habitual-offender statute. After sentencing, he petitioned the New
York court for release on the grounds that an earlier sentence had
been for a misdemeanor; therefore, his sentence as a habitual offender
was improper. After his release on the strength of this petition, the
prosecuting attorney in the county where he had been sentenced as
a habitual offender reinstated prosecution on the original indictment
for burglary and larceny-five years after the event. The New York
court held that this practice of holding an open indictment over the
head of the accused was clearly improper, and that the state had a
positive obligation to go forward with the prosecution, because the
accused could not himself cause the prosecution to be pressed.
The Ohio case of State v. Meeker2 7 was decided in part on similar
grounds. Meeker had introduced a plea of guilty to one of four counts
of an indictment for armed robbery and related offenses. Although
Meeker was sentenced on the one count, the other counts were not
formally disposed. Five years later, Meeker obtained his release from
prison on habeas corpus on the grounds that he had been denied
the right to counsel at his trial. The state then reinstated the old
counts of the indictment. The Ohio State Supreme Court, as New
York has done, held in part that the state could not properly with-
24 The list of cases following this line is seemingly endless. See cases cited in Note,
The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 CoL L. REv. 846, 853, United States v.
Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Quinn, 314 F.Supp. 233
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Fabian v. State, 3 Md. App. 270, 239 A.2d 100 (1968); State v.
Henry, 13 Ohio App.2d, 235 N.E.2d 533 (1968).
25 183 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
26 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955).
27 26 Ohio St.2d 9, 268 N.E.2d 589 (1971). See State v. Meeker, No. 5193, Lake County
Common Pleas, May 21, 1969, opinion of Simmons, J., at p. 4.
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hold prosecution on some counts of an indictment, just in case the
accused should later be released.
Acquiescence
Acquiescence, in the context of the Speedy Trial Clause, can be
defined as the defendant's joining the prosecution, or at least not
opposing prosecutorial actions, in delaying trial.28 While not so thor-
oughly explored as the demand doctrine, this holding is also well
represented in decisional law.29
Like the demand doctrine, the acquiescence doctrine holds that
inaction by the accused can be used to defeat his claim to denial of
a speedy trial. If, for instance, the prosecution seeks a continuance
and the defendant does not actively oppose this move, he will gen-
erally be held to have acquiesced in the delay, and thus to have
waived his right to a speedy trial.30
Actions by the Accused
Holdings that any "dilatory" actions by the accused serve to
forestall his right to a speedy trial are functionally the other side of
the acquiescence coin. One who raises no objection to prosecutorial
dilatory tactics is held to have acquiesced; 31 one who employs dila-
tory tactics of his own is held not only to have acquiesced in delay,
but to have caused it, and thus to have waived his right to speedy
trial.32 As the name implies, this is a doctrine requiring affirmative
action by the accused, but the affirmative action can result in an
implied waiver.33 If this statement of the doctrine is confusing to the
reader, it is no less so to the accused whose Sixth-Amendment right
is defeated by it.
28 See e.g., Hedgepeth v. United States, 364 F.2d 684, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; United
States v. Roberts, 408 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Richardson, 291
F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
29 United States v. Kabot, 185 F.Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Dickey v. Florida, 398
U.S. 30, 51 (1970).
20 People v. Jones, 266 N.E.2d 411, 414, (Il1. App. 1971); Shepherd v. United States,
163 F.2d 974, 976 (8th Cir. 1947) ; People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891,
896 (1955) 'semble'.
81 Id.; Hedgepeth v. United States, 364 F.2d 684, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; United States v.
Roberts, 408 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Richardson, 291 F.Supp. 441(S.D.N.Y. 1968) ; United States v. Kabot, 185 F.Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Dickey
v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
2 People v. Jones, 266 N.E.2d, 411, 414 (Ill. App. 1971) ; State ex rel. O'Leary v. Cuya-
hoga Falls Municipal Court, 176 Ohio St. 197, 198 N.E.2d 660, 661 (1964) ; United
States ex rel. Hanson v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1948) cert. denied, 334- U.S. 849(1948) ; State ex rel. Thomas v District Court of Thirteenth Judicial Dist. In and
For Big Horn County, 151 Mont. 1, 438 P.2d 554 (1968); Raburn v. Nash, 78 N.M.
385, 431 P.2d 874 (1967), petition dismissed 389 U.S. 999 (1968) ; Hall v. State, 3
Md. App. 680, 240 A.2d 630 (1968).
83 As the discussion with respect to acquiescence and actions by the accused tends to
show, the difference between the two is not always clear-cut, even though one is
ostensibly passive and the other active in its operation. See also Note, The Right to
a Sp1eedy Criminal Trial, 57 COL. L. REV. 846, 856; State ex rel. O'Leary v. Cuyahoga
Falls Municipal Court, 176 Ohio St. 197, 198 N.E.2d 660 (1964); Mattoon v. Rhay,
313 F.2d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 1963) ; People v. Jones, 266 N.E.2d 411 (Il1. App. 1971);
But see United States v. Dillon, 183 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ; People v. Prosser,
309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955).
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The Unconstitutional Waiver Doctrine
".... Everyone is for a 'speedy trial' as a constitutional principle,
but there is a good deal of resistance to a speedy trial in practice".3 4
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution says "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial. . . " "... . The word 'speedy' was nowhere modified
or watered down.... "35 The Sixth Amendment does not say "... so long
as he demands one early in the course of the proceedings, fights the
prosecution tooth and nail in any of its attempts to delay trial, and
doesn't bring any motions before trial himself; provided however,
that if the prosecutor is busy, or just doesn't feel like bringing the
case to trial, this Amendment shall be of no effect." Some of these
contentions in our non-existent continuation of the Speedy-Trial Clause
are merely without support in parallel decisions based on the other
rights found in the Sixth Amendment;3 6 others are directly contrary
to recognized constitutional principles; 37 and some of the pronounce-
ments found in decisional law relative to the Speedy-Trial Clause
lead to logical absurdities.33
Some points should be made clear as a preamble to any criticism
of the waiver doctrine in its application to the Speedy-Trial Clause:
(1) There can be no real quarrel with a holding of waiver where
the accused uses clearly dilatory tactics in an effort to delay an almost
certain conviction, such as unsupportable motions for change of venue
or continuance, or baseless allegations of Miranda violations.
(2) Procedural delays for the benefit of the accused are properly
looked upon with favor by the courts, but should not be construed
as a waiver per se of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.39
(3) Where one procures delay by extra-judicial tactics such as
flight from the jurisdiction, intimidation of witnesses or subornation
or perjury, he is properly held to be estopped from asserting his right
to a speedy trial.
(4) Delay in a criminal trial frequently, but by no means always,
operates in the defendant's favor, and any claim of deprivation of
constitutional right due to such delay is properly regarded with a
jaundiced, but not a jaded, eye.40
34 Nixon, The President's Message, 54 JUDICATREt 404, 405 (1971).
35 Id.
36 See People v. Jones, 266 N.E.2d 411, 414 (Il1. App. 1971) ; State ex rel. O'Leary v.
Cuyahoga Falls Municipal Court, 176 Ohio St. 197, 198 N.E.2d 660, 661 (1964); Mat-
toon v. Rhay, 313 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1963) ; State v. Meeker, 26 Ohio St.2d 9, 268
N.E.2d 389 (1971).
37 Cf. cases cited, note 12, sepra, and notes 67 and 69, infra, with Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
SB See notes 68 through 73, infra, accompanying text, and cases there cited.
9 Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REv. 1587, 1598-99 (1965).
See also United States v. Davis, 365 F.2d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 1966) (defendant in-
competent to stand trial).
40 United States ex re. Von Cseh v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 1963).
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But with the above comments to the contrary notwithstanding,
the principles of constitutional law are ill served by unsupportable
legal fictions41 to achieve the dubious end of being sure that some
"rotten crook" doesn't thwart justice by virtue of the prosecution
having tabled his case for several years.42 It does not require citation
of authority to say that under our system of jurisprudence, an accused
is only that; he is not guilty until so proven in a court of law, after
a trial conducted with all the procedural fairness required by the
mandate of our Constitution, with proper regard for the provisions
of the Sixth Amendment. The first command of the Sixth Amendment
is for a speedy trial.
Who, then, is to say that one clause of the Sixth Amendment is
less important than another? Or that the Sixth Amendment is less
important than the First? Or the Fifth? And so forth.
Indeed, going even in the opposite direction from the tendency of
the lower courts to denigrate the Speedy-Trial Clause, Mr. Chief
Justice Warren, speaking for the Court in Klopfer v. North Carolina,
said:
"The history of the right to a speedy trial and its reception in
this country clearly establish that it is one of the most basic rights
preserved by our Constitution."43
The Demand Doctrine
The Sixth-Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial is skeletal, as
are other clauses in the Bill of Rights; the framers gave us no flesh
upon this skeleton. Are we therefore permitted to clothe it as is our
wont, operating in a legal vacuum? Or must we adhere to principles
that are generic to the interpretation of our Constitution as a uni-
fied system?
The contention presented here is that judicial interpretation of
our Constitution is and has been reasonably uniform; what has ap-
plied to one amendment or clause has been held to apply in a parallel,
if not identical fashion, to others.44
4' Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) ; Bruce v. United States, 351 F.2d 318
(5th Cir. 1965) (Seven-year delay; defendant held to have waived speedy trial by
lack of demand) ; but see note 4, supra; and cf. United States v. Mann, 291 F. Supp.
268 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (even assuming that defendant had waived speedy trial by
inaction, it would be improper to try him 16 years after the alleged crime).
42 Mr. Chief Justice Stone was perhaps more elegant in his description of the applica-
tion of the Constitution to all of the people without discrimination when he said:
" . . Constitutional safeguards for the protection of all who are charged with
offenses are not to be disregarded in order to inflict merited punishment on
some who are guilty. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 119, 132. Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942).
43 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967) (Emphasis added).
44 See e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), where the Court drew analogies
within and between the Fifth and Sixth Amendments (self-incrimination and right
to counsel).
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This is as it should be; there is no justification for liberal con-
struction of one portion of any law, with concomitant strict construc-
tion of another portion of that same law. So if one may only waive
his right against self-incrimination ". . knowingly and intelligently
. . .,,,45 is it asking less that he waive his right to a speedy trial with
that same quantum of knowledge and intelligence?
Thus, there exists no rational basis for holding waiver by silence
in speedy-trial cases, while requiring clear and firm announcement
in open court in other types of cases, and even in some cases,
prohibiting waiver of a right.46 Yet the state and lower federal courts
have done just that.47
The demand doctrine, with its finding of tacit waiver, is without
support from the Supreme Court, except in the Court's silence in the
matter.48 But in speaking on another Sixth-Amendment right, the
right to counsel, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, said in
Johnson v. Zerbst,
... The Sixth Amendment stands on a constant admoni-
tion that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost,
justice will not "still be done" . . . .[T]he average defendant
does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself
when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life
or liberty....
. ..There is insistence here that petitioner waived this
constitutional right. . . . It has been pointed out that "courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of fun-
damental constitutional rights and that we "do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." A waiver
is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege. . . 49 (Emphasis added.)
In Johnson v. Zerbst, the petitioner had been arrested on a charge
of uttering counterfeit money. Interestingly, the problem there was
not the lack of speedy trial, but rather a too-speedy trial. Johnson
was held in prison, unable to make bail for about two months. Then
in the space of two days, he was indicted, arraigned, tried, convicted,
43 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
48 Cf., e.g., United States v. Jones, 403 F.2d 4-98 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied. 391t U.S.
94-7 (1969) (failure of defendant to demand trial resulted in waiver of right), with
United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 271 F.Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), re''d on
other grounds 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969) (counsel's failure to object to clearing of
court did not result in waiver of defendant's right to a public trial), and with
McDowell v. United States, 274 F.Supp. 426 (E.D. Tenn. 1967) (defendant held to
have no constitutional right to waive jury to avoid risking the death penalty). Inter-
estingly, these are all Sixth-Amendment rights.
47 Id.
48 Note 19, sutra; however, see Sheppard v. Ohio, 352 U.S. 910 (1956), denying cer-
tiorari, and Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950), denying cer-
tiorari.
49 304 U.S. 458, 463-64 (1938), citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393
(1937), Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882), and Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v.
Public Utilities Comm'n., 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1932). Note that Mr. Justice Black, here
scarcely lifting pen from paper, dealt at once with demand and acquiescence and
their too-ready acceptance in depriving the accused of constitutional rights.
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sentenced and removed to the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary. On
habeas corpus, Johnson maintained that he had been denied the right
to counsel. The district court, in denying the petition of habeas corpus,
held that Johnson had waived the right by not demanding counsel.
The Supreme Court, as we have seen, was rather short in dealing
with this holding by the district court.
If we accept the premise that Sixth-Amendment rights are co-
equal (ignoring, for the moment, the question of the equality of other
amendments, one with the other), then this statement must be as
valid with respect to a speedy trial as it is concerning the right to the
assistance of counsel. Indeed, if we substitute speedy-trial terminology
for the operational words of the right to counsel, the proscription
against waiver is highlighted:
The constitutional right of an accused to [a speedy trial]
invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court. . . This
protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibil-
ity upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an
intelligent and competent waiver by the accused ...
The purpose of the constitutional guaranty of right to
[a speedy trial] .. .would be nullified by a determination
that an accused's ignorant failure to claim his rights removes
the protection of the Constitution .... 50
In contrast to the state and lower federal courts, Mr. Justice
Black in Johnson inveighed strongly against silent, implied, negligent,
or any other kind of waiver of constitutional rights, excepting only
an intentional relinquishment . . .of a known right. .. "51
The Court's distaste for implied waiver by failure strongly to
assert a right is also shown in another Sixth-Amendment aspect, the
Confrontation Clause. In Barber v. Page,52 the petitioner's attorney
in the state preliminary hearing had not cross-examined a witness;
the witness's testimony was introduced by transcript at trial, over
objection by the petitioner. The witness, at the time of trial, was in
federal prison, and the state had made no effort to produce him at
trial. The state court held that the petitioner had not been denied
the right of confrontation; in argument before the Supreme Court,
the state maintained that the petitioner had waived the right by
failure to cross-examine the witness at the time of the preliminary
hearing. 53 Mr. Justice Marshall, speaking for eight members of the
Court was uncharitable in his criticism of the state's position:
...That contention is untenable. . . .To suggest that
failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a
waiver of the right of confrontation at a subsequent trial
50 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938).
51 Id at 464.
Z2 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
53 Id. at 720, 725.
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hardly comports with this Court's definition of a waiver
as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege. '54
But the Court didn't stop there. "Moreover, we would reach the
same result on the facts of this case had petitioner's counsel actually
cross-examined [the witness] at the preliminary hearing . . .
If the Confrontation Clause is so important as to call forth this
gratuitous dictum, one is constrained to wonder why speedy-trial has
been so studiously ignored, when the opportunity seems to present
itself at almost every Term.5 6
It has already been submitted here that the right to a speedy
trial is no less important that any other Sixth-Amendment right.57
The right is rooted deeply in our common-law heritage, being found
almost explicitly in Magna Carta: ". . . we will not deny or defer to
any man either justice or right",58 furnishing a sound basis for the
language of the Sixth Amendment.
The barons at Runnymede were certainly not putting words on
paper simply to describe technicalities. They spoke from experience
which showed the dangers inherent in unbridled power over the
lives of the citizens. Perhaps in our sophisticated society, we have
become so accustomed to these trappings of civilization that we label
some as "technicalities". The right to a speedy trial, sadly, seems to
be one of those.
Our constitutional ancestors ... conscious as they were
of history, . . . added provisions to our Constitution designed
to assure order and method in the criminal process--to assure
that every man receives procedural fairness without which
there is no justice.
Insistence upon procedural standards, commanded by our
Constitution, is not a technicality. . . . Observance of the
rights which secure freedom is not a technicality....
What is liberty if it is not the right to due process of law
in all of its forms, before the state may consign us to prison
or take our life? 9
An excellent-if indeed, not the prime-reason for construing the
Speedy-Trial Clause strictly against the prosecution is because of its
effect on the "little man", the indigent, the uninformed.
Consider the following analysis of human behavior: A spectacular
murder occurs; the accused is prominent; the case has all the trap-
pings of sex, scandal and sensationalism so dear to the hearts of the
54 Id. at 725 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938).
56 Id.
56 Note 19, supra; But cf. the opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the denial of cer-
tiorari in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919: ". .. [A] denial
carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits
of a case which it has declined to review.
57 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967), and accompanying text.
58 Magna Carta, c 29, quoted in Klopfer v. North Carolina 336 U.S. 213, 223 (1967)
(emphasis added).
59 Fortas, The Fight for Due Proceis, 73 CASE ANDS CoM. 16, (1968).
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yellow journalists.60 Here, the prosecution would not even fleetingly
consider .dragging its feet. The speedier the trial, the better, while
the lurid details are freshin the minds of all. Further, the accused,
assuming that speedy trial is to his advantage and liking, would
stridently demand to be brought to trial; and being of more than
moderate means would be able to afford counsel to protect his
rights, or if of less affluence, could nevertheless acquire a "public-
spirited" attorney for reasonable expense,
But what of the "pump jockey" at a ghetto, gas station, accused
of. the theft of two tires from his former employer? He steadfastly
maintains his innocence, and languishes in jail, unable, to make bond.
Without funds to retain counsel, he is unrepresented until counsel
is assigned.61 Assigned counsel, either from the ranks of socially-
conscious attorneys, or the Legal Aid Society, have little time for the
constitutional in-fighting that the demand doctrine imposes upon
them.6 2 The prosecution, busy with the big murder case or other
day-to-day business won't push this two-bit larceny unless it is ab-
solutely necessary.
Thus, the one who needs most the protection of the Sixth Amend-
ment is least likely to get it. Under the proposition advanced here,
the right to a speedy trial doesn't seem to be much of a "technicality".
The Acquiescence Doctrine
The notion that the accused waives his right to a speedy trial by
his acquiescence in motions by the prosecution to continue or delay
trial does a dis-service to cooperation and courtesy between attor-
neys. A prosecuting attorney's workload is usually quite large. It
happens, on occasion, that he finds it necessary to ask for a continu-
ance simply due to the press of his work or conflicts in court cal-
endars. In a civil case, the opposing attorney, almost as a matter of
course, would agree to the postponement, and ordinarily neither side
is penalized for such action. However, under cases interpreting the
right of the accused to a speedy trial, defense counsel must oppose
such a motion, even if comity and courtesy would ordinarily require
that he assist his brother attorney in solving his time problem, be-
cause as we have seen,63 failure of defense counsel to object to a
continuance causes him to run a severe risk of "waiving" his client's
right to be tried speedily.:
Referring again to Johnson v. Zerbst,6 4 we see that the Court, in
addition to defining waiver as ". . . an intentional relinquishment or
80 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Ohio, 352 U.S. 910 (1956), denying certiorari; Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 394 U.S. 333 (1966).
I' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
82 The writer speaks here from his personal experience in the Cleveland-Marshall
Legal Aid program, and discussions with attorneys in Ohio, New York and Calif-
ornia.
69 See, Note 30, supra.
e6 304 U.S. 453 (1938).
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abandonment of a known right or privilege.. . ,65 also said ". . . we
do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights .... ,,6
So we see that the Court seems to be out of step with the rest of
the federal judiciary by proclaiming that acquiescence will not be
presumed, absent unequivocal actions or words by the accused.
Acquiescence, like demand, is improperly inferred by the failure
of the accused stridently to demand his rights. "Presuming waiver
from a silent record is impermissible .... -67 (Emphasis in the original).
Here, the Court was speaking of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. We must then ask, is the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial to be offered less readily?
Acts by Defendant
It is not to be denied that certain acts by the defendant are prop-
erly held to be a waiver; this applies to rights other than the right
to a speedy trial. The accused may waive his right to counsel, he may
waive the right not to testify against himself, or he may waive the
right not to have troops quartered in his house.
Within the scope of the Speedy-Trial Clause, the action by the
defendant of removing himself from the jurisdiction of the court is
a waiver of his right to a speedy trial in terms so clear as to afford
no basis for argument.6" Other examples could be brought forth; un-
questionably, there is a continuum beginning with defendant's flight
and going through to cases where defendant has stood ready at all
times and has demanded trial. Somewhere between these two extremes
is a point where legitimate debate would center on the question:
Which acts by the defendant properly constitute a waiver of his
right to a speedy trial? The contention made here is that current
judicial holdings are weighted improperly and far too heavily against
the defendant.
If an accused is charged with a crime, he dares not, under current
holdings, assert certain constitutional rights, on pain of "forfeiting"
his right to be tried speedily.69 For instance, if he moves to suppress
evidence on the ground of illegal search (Fourth Amendment); on
the ground of improper post-arrest proceedings without the assistance
of counsel (Sixth Amendment); if he moves to change venue (Sixth
Amendment); or even possibly if he asks for a bill of particulars
(Sixth Amendment), the weight of present authority holds that he
has, by his own act, contributed to delay in bringing the matter
65 Id. at 464.
6s Id.
67 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
68 Flagg v. State, 11 Ga. App. 37, 74 S.E. 562 (1912); Goman v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St.
236, 199 N.E.2d 10 (1964-).
89 People v. Jones, 266 N.E.2d 411, 414 (I1. App. 1971); State ex el. O'Leary v. Cuya-
hoga Falls Municipal Court, 176 Ohio St. 197, 198 N.E.2d 660, 661 (1964) ; Mattoon v.
Rhay, 313 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1963).
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speedily to trial, and has thus "waived" his Sixth Amendment right
to a speedly trial.70
Such holdings do not bear up under rational analysis. Does our
Constitution require the accused to decide which rights he will assert,
as compared to others, which are then unavailable? It hardly seems
proper that we ration constitutional guarantees, telling the accused,
in effect, that he may choose one from Column A, two from Column
B, and so forth, but that his choice of suppressing illegally procured
evidence precludes a speedy trial, or that defendant's demand for
trial by jury precludes his requesting a change of venue. 71 Or that
we say "Here, take any five rights you want. Leave the rest; they're
over your limit." Nowhere is there any authority for such a holding.
Yet that is the precise effect of the current majority position.
... IT]he state . . . may not impose conditions which
require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the
state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right
as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a
surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded
in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manip-
ulated out of existence.72
In considering the statements made immediately preceding here,
we see the thinness of the logic on which too many holdings have been
based in denying to the accused his fundamental right to a speedy
trial. Indeed, it may even be said that such a holding of waiver of
the right to a speedy trial by the assertion of other constitutional
rights casts a "chilling effect" on the assertion of those rights, 73 and
thus that such a position is unconstitutional per se.
The future of the Speedy-Trial Clause.
Mr. Justice Brennan, in Dickey v. Florida,74 spoke at length in his
concurring opinion about the yet unresolved questions raised by the
Speedy-Trial Clause. It would seem that the Court's somewhat short
shrift with respect to Dickey goes no further than the rather narrow
holding of the case. However, the concurring opinion can be read
as leaving the door ajar to further attacks on the waiver doctrine. 75
It should be noted that while the opponents of the waiver doctrine
70 People v. Jones, 266 N.E.2d 411 (Il1. App. 1971) ; but see State v. Meeker, 26 Ohio
St. 2d 9, 268 N.E.2d 589 (1971).
71 An interesting lawyer's comment on this is found in HOLMES, THE SHEPPARD MURDER
CASE 213 (1961) ; "How it can be seriously argued that a man is trying to escape
trial because he refuses to surrender his constitutional right to a jury trial strains
comprehension ....
72 Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Commission of California, 271 U.S. 583, 594
(1926).
73 Cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969).
74 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
75 Id. at 44.
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are still in the minority, that minority seems to be gaining strength,
and certainly they have the better law.7 6
The Speedy-Trial Clause as it should be
The Sixth Amendment promises the right to a speedy trial to
the accused in all criminal prosecutions without qualification. Thus,
it cannot be held to.hinge upon the demand by the accused that he
be brought to trial, any more than the accused must demand the
Sixth Amendment's requirements of representation by counsel, trial
by jury, or confrontation of witnesses against him.
It is the duty of the public prosecutor not only to prose-
cute those charged with crime, but also to observe the con-
stitutional mandate guaranteeing a speedy trial. If a prose-
cutor fails to do so, the defendant cannot be held to have
waived his constitutional right to a speedy trial.77
Thus, in a parallel with the right of the 'accused not to have to
testify, against himself, neither should the accused, having been pro-
ceeded against by the state, be required. to bring his own cause to
trial.7 8 Indeed, it is impossible for the accused to bring himself to trial.
It is surely as improper for the state to require a man to harry
and badger the prosecution to bring his case along as it is for the
state to require him to prove his innocence, simply because the state
has preferred charges against him. The Fifth Amendment does not
permit the latter; the Sixth Amendment should not be construed
to permit the former.
The Speedy-Trial Clause should be read in a more reasonable
fashion than it has, and this without regard to protestations of clogged
court calendars and heavy prosecution workloads. Complaints that
this application of the Sixth Amendment would be improper or ad-
ministratively unsound are without merit.79
. . . [T]he fact that . . . delay was attributable to con-
gested calendar conditions . . . and that the district attorney
was "ready" and judges "willing" to hear the case seems to
me beside the point. As far as the defendant is concerned,
he suffered the denial of a speedy trial whether the prose-
cutor or the court was at fault or completely blameless .... 80
The Fifth Amendment proclaims that no man may be forced to
convict himself out of his own mouth. Certainly, this makes the job
of the investigation and the prosecutor more -difficult; however, this
has not deterred the Court from placing severe restraints on the
7s United States v. Mann, 291 F.Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. Dillon, 183
" F.Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); State v. Meeker, 26 Ohio St. 2d 9, 268 N.E.2d 589
(1971). And see Second Circuit Criminal Rules, supra., Note 4, Rule 8, at LXI.
7 United States v. Dillon, 183"F.Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). This opinion was quoted
with approval by Mr. Justice Brennan in Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, at 44.(1970).
7s See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, (1970) (Dissenting opinion by Black, J.).
79 Pollard v. United States, 362 U.S. 354, 364 (1959).
80 People v. Ganci, 27 N.Y.2d 4-18, 267 N.E.2d 263, 270 (1971) (dissenting opinion by
Fuld, J.).
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admissability of coerced confessions."' So, by the same token, minor
inconveniences to the judge, the prosecutor or policeman is insuffi-
cient reason for denial of the application of other constitutional
guarantees. Certainly, the mandate of the First Amendment causes
administrative difficulties in many jurisdictions. But it is clear that
such difficulties are insufficient of themselves to permit any abridge-
ment of the freedom of speech, religion or assembly.8 2 Administrative
difficulties are insufficient excuse to permit any abridgement of any
constitutional right.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has traced, albeit somewhat roughly, and
perhaps too briefly, the contours of the waiver doctrine; and has
shown the constitutional weakness of that doctrine as applied to the
Speedy-Trial Clause. Waiver, as defined in Johnson v. Zerbst, 3 requires
that the accused apply himself deliberately and intelligently to the
serious matter of waiving his constitutional rights. But the waiver
doctrine gratuitously supplies that application for the accused in the
case of his right to a speedy trial.
By analogy with other constitutional rights, the right to a speedy
trial is properly one which can be waived by the accused only in the
clearest terms. Thus, once the state has begun proceedings against
any person, the state is properly charged with the speedy prosecu-
tion of those proceedings to their reasonable determination. And once
the state has brought charges, the accused properly need make no
move to hasten these proceedings. Therefore, if the state brings an
action and then permits this action to lie fallow, the accused should
properly be dismissed from the consequences of that indictment with-
out regard to whatever action he may have taken, except where that
action is clearly inimical to reasonable adjudication of the cause.
It is hoped that the Court will soon see fit to consider the ques-
tion of waiver of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. As shown,
the demand doctrine needs clarification and delineation; the thesis
developed here holds that the demand doctrine should be invalidated
as it applies to Sixth Amendment rights, and particularly to the right
of the accused to a speedy trial.
81 Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
82 See, e.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
83 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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